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Summary findings
Sewell argues that in Belarus the term "enterprise social  utility services. As much as 25 percent of unemployment
assets" is just about always a misnomer for fringe benefits  in transition economies has been attributed to labor
that were part of the normal wage bargain with  immobility arising from lack of housing.
employees and were a rational response to labor  Local infrastructure is clearly a responsibility
shortages and constraints on wage offers in the old  appropriate to local governments. In Belarus assigning
command economy. Firms in market economies respond  services such as education and health care to local
similarly to the same incentives, and the continuing  governments is more debatable.
favorable tax treatment  of benefits explains much of  Methods of financing local services also need to be
their continued importance,  in Belarus and elsewhere.  addressed. The central government shares its revenues
Between 1994 and 1995 those benefits, as a portion of  with local governments based on the area where the
employee remuneration  in Belarus, were cut by at least  revenues are collected, but such revenue sharing
two-thirds. The economic downturn  then contributed to  inherently leads to more resources going to wealthier
a relative decline in benefits, particularly those involving  regions. Moreover,  the subnational share of government
capital expenditures such as housing construction  and  revenues has declined, from 70 percent in 1992 to 48
maintenance.  percent in 1996. T he earmarked taxes levied on enter-
Large enterprises provided more benefits than other  prises to pay for housing maintenance and kindergartens
firms, and the quality of services provided by enterprises  are not justified because no close link exists between
was considered superior to those provided by the  beneficiaries and payments. In fact, too much use is
government. In other economies of the former Soviet  made of earmarked taxes in Belarus. And the taxes
Union enterprise costs for these services have also been  levied by subnational governments raise insignificant
found to be higher because of the substantially higher  revenues.
salaries paid to employees who provided these services.  Cost recovery from users should finance local utilities.
Whether  most of those benefits should still receive  Belarus also needs effective real estate taxes to finance
public subsidies or preferential tax treatment is debat-  local government services to property; current  land use
able. A case can be made for some government funding  taxes cost more to administer than they raise in revenues.
of public health and kindergarten services. It is also  Where transfers to local governments are required,
essential to find alternative sources of housing and public  Sewell recommends formula financing.
This paper - a product of the Technical and EC4 Departments of the Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a
larger effort to find solutions to the problems of transition in the economies of this region. Copies of this paper are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433-0001.  Please contact Constance
Lawrence, room H7-092,  telephone extension 32216,  fax 477-0686, internet address clawrence(worldbank.org  (31
pages).
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development  issues.  An objective  of the series  is  to get the  findings  out quickly,  even if the  presentations  are less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors,  They do not necessarily  represenit  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they represent.
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1.  Firms in Belarus spend on many functions  classified  as "social" in their enterprise accounting.
Examples  are housing  for employees,  summer  camps for the children  of employees,  spas for employees,
health and dental clinics on site and specialized  medical and dental facilities off site, subsidized  food,
creches  and kindergartens,  and vocational  schools.  In some  localities  finns also provide  local infrastructure
such as district heating, electricity  and water and sewer reticulation.  Extensive provision of such local
infrastructure  may have  been particularly  common  by state  and collective  farms.
2.  It has long been asserted  that the "divestiture"  of such "social" functions  is critical to improving
the competitiveness  of enterprises in  transition economies. It  might well be  added that enterprise
"divestiture"  of such "social" functions  is equally  critical  to appropriate  functioning  of governments  in the
transition  economies.  Enterprises  and govemment  should  be responsible  and accountable  for different  and
distinct sets  of  functions. Achievement  of  these goals  is  impossible if  enterprises share  vague
responsibilities  for social functions  and are repeatedly  subject  to pressures  to provide  such functions  by
means  of unfunded  government  mandates.  Obviously,  such a system of financing  social objectives  is not
transparent, allows both parties to evade hard budget constraints, and thereby obscures and dilutes
accountability  to enterprise  owners  and the electorate.
3.  In transition  economies,  the state also has to consider  whether  it wishes  to continue  to directly  fund
some of these social functions  if enterprises  discontinue  their funding.  If govenmment  is to be involved  in
continued  provision  of these  services,  the appropriate  level  of government  has to be chosen  for the purpose
and the function  should  be adequately  funded.  The objective  of this paper  is to examine  these  issues as they
apply  to Belarus  and suggest  appropriate  policy  actions.
4.  The Russian Government  was the first to ask the World Bank for assistance with respect to
enterprise  social asset divestiture  in early 1994. Since then, the Bank has undertaken several loans in
support of enterprise divestiture  of functions such as housing, kindergartens,  medical care, enterprise
privatization  and related issues in social protection  programs in Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz
Republic.  Staff Appraisal  Reports  for these  loans are a rich  source  of infonnation  on this problem.  As well,
an extensive  published  literature  is being  built  up on the issue. Aggregate  surveys  of the problem  have  been
undertaken  for specific countries  by authors within and outside the Bank, 2 and are complemented  by in
1  This document  was produced as part of the author's responsibility  in the 1996  Belarus Country  Economic  Memorandum
Mission headed by John Hansen. I wish to thank Elena Klochan,  Nikolai Lisai and Konstantin  Senyut  of the World
Bank's Resident  Mission in Minsk, and John Hansen  and Yuliya Merkulova  for assistance in preparing this report.  I
have also benefited from specific comments from Jorge Martinez-Vasquez  and Richard Bird, and from extensive
discussions  at  the Bank with Lev Freinkman and Philip O'Keefe, both of whom are engaged in operations work
associated  with  this issue.
2  See Adrienne Cheasty,  "Social Divestiture  in Ukraine-A  Budgetary  Perspective,"  IMF Fiscal Affairs Department,  OcL
1995; Simon Commander  and Richard  Jackman,  "Providing  Social  Benefits  in Russia:  Redefming  the Roles  of Firms and
Government."  Pblicy  Research  Working  Paper 1184,  Economic  Development  Institute, The World  Bank, 1993;  Simon
Commander and  Une Lee with Andrei Tolstopiatenko,  "Social Benefits and the Russian Industrial Firm," Joint
Conference  of the World Bank and the Ministry of Economy  of the Russian  Federation,  Russia: Economic  Policy and
Enterprise  Restructuring,  June 1995;  Lev M. Freinkman  and Irina  Starodubrovskaya,  "Restructuring  of Enterprise  Social
Assets  in Russia," Policy  Research  Working  Paper 1635,  The World  Bank, August  1966; Jorge Martinez-Vasquez,  "The
Challenge  of Expenditure-Assignment  Reform  in Russia,"  Journal  of Environment  and Planning,  Vol. 12, 1994,  pp. 277-2
depth  surveys  in  particular  fields such  as  kindergartens, 3 housing, 4 and  asset  divestiture  in  problem
industries and regions. 5 We shall draw on this literature as appropriate in our own study' of Belarus, and
attempt to augment it in areas which, in our opinion, have not received as much attention, such as the
implications for local govermment  and the interactions of enterprise provision of these functions with the tax
system.
6
Analysis  of Enterprise  Social Spending
5.  Tables 1-3 use enterprise statistics in Belarus to examine characteristics of spending on employee
remuneration and "social development" and "social benefits" by type of benefit, size of firm, sector of the
economy and region. In addition, but not showNn  in the tables, the relative size of enterprise spending on
these fringe benefits was compared for the years  1994 and  1995. It was also reported to us that there are
systematic differences in fringe benefits available to  different occupations" some occupations such  as
teaching allegedly receivc fewer fringe benefits. Our enterprise data  did not allow us  to  examine such
occupational differences, however.
6.  There are measurement difficulties. Most importantly, data on some types of user cost recovery are
incomplete, such as, for instancc. where fees arc collected for use of facilities such as kindergartens. This
imparts a  downward bias to comparisons over timc, since user  cost recovery has  been increasing for
housing and utilities as a  result of government policy and  indeed is required as a  condition of loans to
Belarus by  the  IMF. A  furthcr  factor  impeding comparisons over time  is that  data  on  the  important
category of housing maintenance undertaken by ente-prises was not collected in 1994.
7.  With these  qualifications in  mind, four  components of  employee remuneration and  enterprise
spending on social functions are distinguished in Tables 1-3: wages; other monetarv payments to employees
(such  as  bonuses  and  retirement allowances).  enterprise spending on  "social  development" functions
(primarily construction and maintenance of housing, infrastructure and facilities for  sports, culture, and
education); and other "social benefits" which consist of enterprise spending in kind taking such forms as
subsidized meals, transport fares, medicines, etc. In Tablcs 2 and 3, we have aggregated firm spending on
"social development" and "social benefits" to show a separate category of employee remuneration, namely
non-monetary remuneration or fringe benefits.
292; Mark  E.  Schaffer,  Richard  Jackman,  Giaspar Faijth and Judit  l.akatos,  Martin  Rein,  Irina 'Fratch  and Andreas
Woergoetter, "Round table on  Divestiture of' social scrvices lrom state-owned enterprises,'"  Economics  of  Transition,
Vol. 3 (2),  1995.
3  See  for  instance  Jeni  Klugman,  Sheila  Marnie,  John  Mickiewright  and  Philip  O'Kcfe,  "Enterprise  Divestiture  of
Kindergartens and Childcare Arrangements in Central Asia,  in Jane lalkingham,  Jeni Klugman,  Sheila Marnie and John
Micklewright (eds), Household  Welfare  in  Central  ,lsia,  (Macmillan, UK, forthcoming 1996).
4  See Robert M. Buckley and Eugene M. Gorenko. "Unwinding the Socialist Wage Package: The Role of Housing in Russia,"
World Bank (TWVTRD),  Dec.  1995, "Russian Enterprise Ilousing Divestiture,": Urban Institute Research Paper,  1995.
5  See Patrick Bodnar, Lev Freinkman, Vladimir Lexin and Alexandcr Shvetsov, "Russia: Financing and Maintenance of Social
Assets Divested from the Coal Industry."  World Bank (ECiC2),  Jtune  1996.
6  I have used three sources for information on the tax systern in B3elarus:  Richiard  M. Bird and Thomas Tsiopoulos,  "Taxation
and  the Development  of Private  Enterprise  in I3clarus'"  EC4C1,  May  1994;  Mick  Keen,  "JTax Reform  in  Belarus:
Preliminary  Report on Economic Aspects," KU 'EJacis,  April 1996. and L. A. Khankevich, "The  Taxation  System in the
Republic of Belarus," EC4C ],  Jutne 1996.3
8.  Table 1 gives a  breakdown  Table  1: Composition  of Enterprise  "Social" Expenditures,  1995
of the types of spending by firms on  Billions
"social"  functions  or  nonmonetary  Belarusian  Percent
remuneration in  1995. Expenditures  Rubels
on  social  development made  up  75  Expenditures  on Social  Development  2,649,653  75
percent  of  the  total,  with  this  Construction  of Facilities  609,512  17
category  of  spending  dominated  in
turn by expenditures on maintenance  Maintenance  of Facilities  1,864,250  53
of housing, infrastructure and  social  Health  267,135  8
facilities,  which  accounted  for  53  Social  Insurance  133,177  4
percent  of  all  nonmonetary  Sports  65,134  2
remuneration  of  employees.
Unfortunately,  no  breakdown  of  Education  294,840  8
expenditures on construction by type  Culture  88,289  2
of facility is  available, but  housing  Housing  and Infrastructure  917,359  26
makes  up  the  largest  category  of  Housing  484,891  14
expenditures  on  maintenance  of
facilities,  accounting for  14 percent  I
of total nonmonetary remuneration. It  Special  Events  175,891  5
is also of interest that maintenance of  Health and Sports  100,442  3
infrastructure,  such  as  repair  of  Education  and Culture  39,606  1
heating plants, made up a further  12  25
percent of total "social" spending by
enterprises.  Total  Expenditures  on Social  3,540,529  100
9.  Finally,  enterprise  spending  Development  and Social  Benefits
on "social benefits," or subsidies in  '  Subsidies  in kind  to employees  such  as subsidized  food,  vouchers  for
kind  which  do  not  include  transport,  etc.
Source: Ministry  of Statistics,  Republic  of  Belarus construction,  maintenance  or
financing of special events, made up
25 percent of all "social" expenditures by enterprises. These "social benefits" included subsidies for such
things  as  commuting and food.  The transportation subsidies were and  are  important  in tight  housing
markets. The importance of food subsidies is seen in the fact that food expenditures in 1995 accounted for
62 percent of consumer budgets in Belarus-ten  times as much as the next largest category of consumer
expenditure, which was clothing.
10.  Enterprise provision of many of these social benefits in former Soviet Union countries has been
observed to be  superior in aggregate to  that available to  other members of the public. 7 To an outside
observer, differences in provision of nonmonetary benefits are most evident by size of enterprise, however.
The dental benefits provided by a large enterprise such as Belarus Railways greatly exceed both in quality
and availability those extended to the ordinary member of the public through state clinics.
11.  Aggregate  statistics  support  this  observation  that  enterprise  spending  on  fringe  benefits  is
systematically correlated with size of firm. As can be seen in Table 2, the quartile comprised of the largest
7  "Enterprise  kindergartens  were  considered  to be superior  in quality  to  municipal  facilities,  and  these  differentials  appear  to
have  persisted:  1994  data for Kazakhstan  show  per child  expenditures  in enterprise  kindergartens  to be twice  that in
those run by the Ministry  of Education."  Klugman  et al., "Enterprise  Divestiture  of Kindergartens  and Childcare
Arrangements  in Central  Asia,"  pp. 3-4. In another  1995  study  for  the Bank  by  ADB  Associates,  it was estimated  that
adoption  of municipal  standards  would  reduce  total kindergarten  costs in the Kyrgyz  Republic  by 20%.  Cited in
Freinkman  and  Starodubrovskaya,  "Restructuring  of  Enterprise  Social  Assets  in  Russia,"  p. 24.4
Table  2:  Composition  of Employee  Remuneration
By Size of Enterprise, 1995
Second
Highest  Highest  Third Highest  Bottom  Grand
Quartile  Quartile  Ouartile  Quartile  Total
Type of Remuneration  % of Total  % of Total  % of Total  % of Total  (0)
Wages  70%  81%  88%  96%  74%
Other Monetary Payments
(Bonuses,  etc.)  15%  12%  8%  2%  14%
Total Monetary  Remuneration  85%  93%  96%  98%  88%
Expenditures  for Social Development  11%  4%  2%  1  %  9%
Expenditures  on Social Benefits  4%  3%  2%  1%/o  3%
Total  Non-monetary  Remuneration  15% 
7 %  4% 
2 %  12%
By Sectors of the Economy, 1995
Industry  Agriculture  Cons ruction  Transport
%of  %of  % of  %of'
Type of Remuneration  Total  T'otal  Total  Total
Wages  69%  80%  78%  72%
Other Monetary Payments
(Bonuses,  etc.)  16%  10%  12%  11%
Total Monetary Remuneration  85%  90%  90%  83%
Expenditures  for Social Development  11%  81%0  7%  15%
Expenditures  on Social Benefits  4%  2%  3%  2%
Total Non-monetary Remuneration  15%  10%  10%  17%
1  Enterprises are ranked by size of total outlays from the largest to the smallest.
Source:  Special compilation by the Ministry of Statistics,  Republic of Belarus
firms spent more than 15 percent of their total outlays for employee remuneration on nonmonetary benefits
in 1995, while the quartile of enterprises comprised of the smallest firms spent only 2 percent.
12.  While  there  is  often a  substantial  difference in costs  of  provision  between "social"  services
provided by enterprises and local governments in the forrner command economies, such differences in costs
are  not entirely attributable to  differences in the  quality of services provided. In fact,  municipal  cost
structures may be lower in part simply because enterprise workers capture substantial rents as compared to
their municipal colleagues. Several examples have been found in other CIS countries where municipal wage
levels for those providing these services are a third less that those in the enterprise sector. 8
8  ADB Associates found that enterprise  kindergarten teachers'  salaries in the Kyrgyz Republic were 10% to 50% higher than
those of municipal kindergarten teachers (cited in Freinkman and Starodubrovskaya, "Restructuring  of Enterprise  Social
Assets  in Russia,"  p.24).  Bodnar  et  al.  (p.8)  report  that  municipal service  workers  (e.g.,  in housing  maintenance)
received wages that were 30% to 40% less than those of equivalent employees of Russian coal companies.5
13.  The proportion of employee remuneration  made up of fringe benefits is also shown in Table 3 to be
much greater in industry than in agriculture and construction, and greater even in transport than in industry.
The apparent reason for the lower spending on fringe benefits in agriculture is greater rural availability of
housing and home-grown food. Table 3 shows that enterprise spending on social development, which is
largely construction and maintenance of housing and infrastructure, and spending on social benefits, which
is in part subsidies for food and meals, account for lower proportions of worker remuneration in agriculture
than in other sectors. A possible explanation offered for the importance of fringe benefits in transport is the
dominance of large enterprises in this industry as compared to, say, the more atomistic nature of much of
the construction industry.
14.  Differences in provision of fringe benefits in the 7 oblasts or principal regional subdivisions of
Belarus shown in Table 3 may reflect underlying differences in the importance of agriculture and industry
in the economies of these regions, but in any event the differences are not great. Separately, it was also
found that they were not consistent between 1994 and 1995.
15.  Although not reported in Tables 1-3, it was also found that expenditures by enterprises for fringe
benefits in  1995 were one third or less of what they were as a proportion of employee compensation in
1994. We have noted that data were not collected for maintenance of housing and infrastructure in 1994
which made up the largest single category of enterprise social expenditures in 1995, accounting in the latter
year for 26 percent of the total. Even without this component, however, enterprise "social" expenditures
amounted to 35  percent of total  cmployee compensation by firms in  1994. In 1995 by  way of contrast,
when maintenance expenditures were recorded and could be included in calculations of enterprise '"social"
expenditures, the latter amounted to 12 percent of total employee  compensation.
16.  Enterprise spending on construction of houses and infrastructure declined precipitously between
1994 and 1995; this category of spending in 1995 being less than  8% of what it was in 1994. Enterprise
construction amounted to 768 billion Belarusian rubels (henceforth BYR) in 1994 and BYR 610 billion in
1995. Taking into account the fact that the producer price index rose more than tenfold from June 1994 to
June  1995.9 however, enterprise social construction in  1995 amounted to only BYR 61 billion in  1994
prices.
17.  The decline in enterprise spending on fringe benefits in  1995 was also evident in our interviews:
enterprises that were visited reported reductions in spending for some types of benefits such as summer
camps for children, by actively promoting purchases bv non-employees and by insisting on greater cost-
recoverv from users. Many fringe benefits which continued to be offered by enterprises were being treated
Table  3: Cbiniion  of Frp4,Iee  Rewwnmemion  By  Ob0a1,  1995  (% of Total)
Minsk
Bresl  Vitebsk  Gotrel  G,rxW  Minsk  City  Regicn  Mogilov  G(mndTotdl
Wages  78%  76%  71°  780/o  72%  720/o  770/o  74%
Other  Mnetary  Payments
toEmnployes  11%  11%  17%  120%  16%  13%  120/o  14%
Exrndinres  for Social
Dev'elopment  8°.o  100/%  10%  7°o  90%  12%  8%  9%
Social  Benefits  for Emnploas  3%  3%  3/o  3%/  30/o  3%  3%  3%
NrimnietaryRenumeratim  110o  130/o  13%  10%  12%  15%  11%  12%/o
Source: Special  conpatiaonoytheMinistryofStatAstics RepulicofBelarus
9  Setting  the producer  price  index  for June  1994  to equal  100,  the June  1995 value  of the  index  was  1078.6
as stand-alone activities which were increasingly expected to pay for themselves.
18.  As  economic pressures  on  enterprises increased between  1994 and  1995, it  is of interest that
enterprises chose to reduce such employee fringe benefits by a  greater proportion than  direct monetary
compensation to  employees. Earlier research in Russia found that  continued enterprise social provision
cushioned  the  effects  of  sharp  falls  in  real  money  wages  in  the  process  of  transition.'0 Managers
interviewed in Belarus, however, regarded many fringe benefits as poorly targeted or low priority forms of
benefit which were obvious candidates for reduction or elimination in cost-cutting drives.
19.  The overall decline in profitability of enterprises in recent years undoubtedly accounts  for the
decline in the provision of fringe benefits in Belarus between 1994 and  1995. The economic pressures on
enterprises have had effects similar to the institution of hard budget constraints in other former command
economies. One would expect the elimination of services of marginal value  in these  circumstances, and
faced with  such hard  budget  constraints, enterprises in other  CIS economies have  apparently  stopped
offering some "social" services or even most such services"
20.  When the very survival of the enterprise is in question, it is also to be expected that new capital
investments will be  postponed and even maintenance of existing capital  will be  deferred if necessary.
Similarly, construction of new housing for employees might be expected to cease along with investments in
new plant and equipment, and maintenance of housing might suffer along with maintenance of plant and
equipment. Such cuts in housing construction and maintenance are well documented in declining industries
in other CIS states, such as in the deeply troubled coal industry in Russia.  12
21.  Other economic pressures on enterprises may have been more substantial in Belarus than in many
CIS states in recent years, such as those imposed by  unfunded mandates of government. In particular,
pressures  to  maintain employment have led to  overmannmg by  an estimated 40  percent, according to
submissions  to  the  Supreme Soviet of  Belarus.  With  such pressures  to  assist  in  reaching  unfunded
governmental objectives, it  is perhaps  surprising that  discretionary  spending on  items  such as  fringe
benefits by Belarus enterprises has not fallen even further.
Comparisons with Provision of Fringe Benefits in OECD Economies
22.  The relative size of enterprise spending on fringe benefits in Belarus is not necessarily that different
from the practice  in some market economies. Whereas fringe benefits amounted to  12 percent of total
employee compensation in Belarus in  1995, in the US in the same year nonwage payments voluntarily
provided by employers were 10.1 percent of employee compensation." 3 On the other hand, the range in
spending on  nonwage benefits in  all  OECD  countries appears  to  be  quite  substantial. 1 4 Practice  also
'°  See  Commander  and  Lee  with  Tolstopiatenko,  "Social  Benefits  and  the  Russian  Industrial  Firm,"  p.i.
Freinkman  and  Starodubrovskaya  state  that  with  the imposition  of hard  budget  constraints  in The  Kyrgyz  Republic,  "most
enterprise  non-housing  social  facilities  were  simply  closed."  See  "Restructuring  of Enterprise  Social  Assets  in Russia,"
p.8.
12  Bodnar  et al. report  that  "in  the three  years  preceding  housing  divestiture,  coal  associations'  actual  expenditure  on housing
decreased  almost  twofold  in real  terms due  to the deterioration  of the mines' financial  performance."  See "Russia:
Financing  and  Maintenance  of Social  Assets  Divested  from  the  Coal  Industry,"  p.  13.
13  Survey  of Current  Business,  May  1996,  Table  1.14,  p. IO.
14  By  way  of contrast,  Schaffer  cites  "costs  of social  provision"  in a 1988  survey  of West  European  industry  varying  from
1.4%  to 12.0%  of total  labor  costs  in different  countries,  but still  concludes  that  "employees  in Western  firms  receive
social  benefits  from  their  employers  which  are about  as costly  in  relative  terms"  as those  in  transition  countries  (Schaffer,
Economics of Transition Round Table, p.248).7
appears to vary  substantially in the former command economics, with "social spending by enterprises"
being 17 percent and 20 percent of the enterprise wage bill in 1993 and 1994 respectively in Russia.  15
23.  Such comparisons are of interest because of concerns as to whether voluntary enterprise spending
on  fringe benefits, together with mandatory wage taxes  imposed to raise revenue and to pay  for  social
protection programs are so high that they adversely affect the 'competitiveness" of enterprises in the former
command economies. Evidence on the  comparative  burden of  wage taxes  in  Belarus  is  presented  in
Appendix A. Wage taxes in Belarus do not appear to posc a problem for competitiveness. If fringe benefits
are fungible with wages in Belarus. which is what our research strongly suggests, they  are part  of the
normal  functioning  of  a  competitive  labor  market  and  also  do  not  adversely  affect  either  the
competitiveness of the enterprise nor the cconomv.
24.  The types of spending on fringe benefits in Belarus and in the OECD economies are quite different,
however. Whereas firms in Belarus spend primarilv on housing, clinics, kindergartens and subsidies in kind,
voluntary employer spending on nonwage benefits in the US, for instance, is primarily on pensions and
insurance, including health, life, and supplemental  unemployment insurance.
25.  A further substantial difference is in the methods of provision. Western firms "outsource" provision
of these benefits; for instance, by hiring insurance companies to provide them. In Belarus, firms engage
directly in a  variety of heterogeneous activities which are extraneous to their core business activities in
order to  provide fringe benefits.  It is distinctly  curious to  see producers of television sets  and heavy
construction equipment running farns  to produce food and vcgetables. to mention two examples from our
interviews; one suspects  that  the  result is an inefficient diversion of  management time from  the core
activities of the enterprise. This practice of not hiring spccialist enterprises to provide these services was
attributed to the need to ensure rcliable sources of supply in the former command economy.  We may expect
such vertical  integration in production of fringe benefits to decrease  as alternative  sources  of  supply
become available in the transition to a market economy.
Reasons for Enterprise Spending on Social Assets
26.  The reasons  for provision of most of thcsc  social assets  by enterprises  provide clues to  their
appropriate treatment in public policy
27.  Many previous studies have emphasized the importancc of non-economic objectives in provision of
these  fringe  benefits.  When their  opinions have  becn canvassed,  for  instance,  over  half  of  Russian
enterprise managers have cited their social responsibilitics as being an important reason for their continued
provision of  fringe benefits.' 6 This  study  parts  company with the emphasis  in  much of the  previous
literature not only on the social significance of these fringe benefits but also on the significance of non-
economic reasons  for their provision.' 7 Simple explanations based  on the economics of enterprises and
economic behavior  are  quite  successful in predicting firm  provision of  fringe  benefits and  might  be
preferred on that basis.
28.  A  market economist mav well wonder whv  manv of these  "social" benefits were provided by
enterprises and need to be provided by governmcnts.  These are not classic "public goods," in the sense that
they are collectively consumed and non-rival in usc. There arc also few "externalities" attached to much of
this expenditure, or advantages that are not capturcd by households  or individuals who benefit directly from
'5  Freinkman  and Starodubrovskaya,  "Restructuring  of Enterprise  Social  Assets in Russia," p.7
16  Commander  and Lee with Tolstopiatenko,  "Russia:  Economic  l'olicy  and Economic  Restructuring,"  p.4.
17 The studies  by Sehaffer  in the Economics  of Transition  Roundtable  and Martinez-Vasquez,  -The Challenge  of Expenditure-
Assignment  Reform  in Russia," indicate  similar  skepticism  about  the importance  of non-economic  motives  in provision  of
these fringe  benefits.them. Examples are housing, summer camps for  children, spas, sports clubs,  vocational schooling and
subsidized canteen meals. We should also note that employees are expected to contribute user fees to many
of these activities from which they benefit, such as for use of kindergartens, thus explicitly recognizing that
these services confer private benefits. We therefore conclude that much of what is called "social" spending
by enterprises was merely a convention of socialist enterprise accounting and there is little that is "social"
about it. Enterprise spending on such fringe benefits may simply be regarded as part of the wage bargain
with employees. An implication is that reductions in spending on many of these fringe benefits merely
represent reductions in the real wage level and have no wider social significance.
29.  This is not to deny the obvious-that  there are social concems with respect to supply of public
goods aspects  of  services such as  kindergartens and  public health; that  the  firm  was  regarded as  an
extension of the state in supplying these goods in the former command economy; and that whatever the
means of providing these services which will eventually evolve in Belarus, their supply in the period of
transition needs attention. With respect to kindergartens, it should also be noted that the final two years of
enrollment are in fact the beginning years of schooling, since primary schooling in countries making up the
former Soviet Union begins at the age of 7 years." 8 This would argue for public financing of kindergartens
by similar means to that used for schooling.
30.  If there is little that is "social" about many of these goods and services, however, one might ask
why were they  provided by  enterprises in the first place and why do they  continue to  be provided by
enterprises. A primary reason for their provision by enterprises was that wages were centrally fixed in the
former command economy and such controls have continued into the period of transition. Until 1995, for
example, enterprises in Belarus were subject to global caps on the wage bill which, if exceeded, led to tax
penalties. But enterprises could compete for labor by the provision of fringe benefits and such competition
was a rational economic response to the general scarcity of labor  in the old command economy. 19 Such
motivations were  evident in enterprise provision of  benefits such as kindergartens.20  It was  especially
important, however, for enterprises to compete for labor by providing housing, which was the largest form
of in-kind payment. 21 Some other subsidies in kind, such as for transportation, also originated in this need
to supply housing. Thus  commuting subsidies were offered in an effort to offset the effects of tight local
housing markets by drawing in labor from wider areas.
31.  We inferred above that the breakdow-n  of worker pay between money wages and fringe benefits
should ordinarily be of no interest to public policy, if there is no bias in public treatment of the two types of
remuneration.  In  these  circumstances,  the  composition of  remuneration is  strictly  a  matter  between
employer and employee. In fact, however, public policy does not provide a level playing field in treatment
18  Klugmanet.  al. observe that "kindergartens  did indeed have a developmental role in the Soviet Union and primary school
curricula  assumed  that  children  already  had  basic  literacy  and  counting  skills."  See  "Enterprise  Divestiture  of
Kindergartens and Childcare Arrangements in Central Asia," p.3.
9  Interestingly enough, provision of important fringe benefits such as employer-provided health insurance has similar origins
in the United States.  "Employer provided health insurance xvas encouraged by the 1942 Stabilization Act, which placed
limits on wage increases but allowed employers to offer insurance plans to their employees," (Jonathan Gruber and James
Poterba, "Tax  Subsidies to Employer-Provided HIealth Insurance," NBER Working Papers  No. 5147, June  1995, p.5 fn.
3).
20  enterprise provision of kindergartens  .- furthered state policy of attaching employees to their place of work to discourage
unplanned turnover. Enterprise managers were willing agents in this respect, as they had little autonomy in setting money
wages,  and used  noncash benefits,  such as subsidized kindergartens,  to attract  and  retain  workers."  Klugman  et  al.,
"Enterprise Divestiture of Kindergartens and Childcare Arrangements in Central Asia," p.3.
21"In  all  socialist  countries,  enterprise  housing  production  programs  were  a  key  means  of  gaining  access  to  new
housing...enterprises which produced significant amounts of housing were seen as attractive employers. Employment with
such firms provided a way to jump the waiting list for housing provided by the state." Buckley and Gorenko, "Unwinding
the Socialist Wage Package: The Role of lHousing  in Russia," p 1.9
of  fringe  benefits  and  wages  in  Belarus.  Whatever  the  historical  origin  of  enterprise  provision  of
nonmonetary benefits, their continued provision appears to owe much to their tax treatment.
32.  Strategic  objectives in  all  tax  systems  involve balancing  goals  of  raising  revenue,  equitable
treatment of individuals, efficiency in the allocation of resources and incentives  for the supply of particular
goods and services. With respect to equity, a fundamental principle underlying an income tax is that all
income from whatever source should be taxed similarly. 22 Efficiency concerns dictate similar equality in
treatment  of different sources  of income, so  that  resources are  not wasted  in  avoidance activities  to
minimize  tax liability or enforcement efforts to counter such avoidance. 23 It is not unusual, however, to find
some types of fringe benefits receiving preferential tax treatment to encourage their provision. In the United
States, for instance, employer-provided  health insurance premiums are deductible business expenses in the
calculation of corporate income taxes, are not taxable as personal income in the hands of the beneficiary
and are not included in the wage tax base for the payroll tax.
33.  There is, in fact, a close interaction between the sizes of tax rates on income and the extent to
which nontaxable benefits are offered to employees. Recent econometric evidence suggests that  lowering
income tax rates substantially reduces the demand for nontaxable benefits in the US.24
34.  Belarus is no exception to this relationship between tax rates and the extent to which nontaxable
benefits are extended to employees. With one exception, all fringe benefits in Belarus are deductible before
enterprise profit taxes are calculated. 25 All non-wage fringe benefits are excluded from the payroll tax base,
however, and  such taxes  amount to  46  percent of payrolls. On the  side of personal income taxation,
moreover, the  principal  nonmonetary  form  of  income, that  from  housing  services which  have  been
substantially provided by employers, is tax-free to the recipient-whether  such housing is actually built by
employers or acquired by means of monetary subsidies from employers. Other types of financial and non-
financial benefits  for  workers  receive  less favorable  but  still  advantageous  tax  treatment.  They  are
theoretically subject to tax if they exceed 30 and 20 minimum monthly wages, respectively, or just under 3
and 2 months salary for the average worker. 26 Enforcement  of the latter provision appears to be ineffective,
however.27  In total, this tax treatment constitutes a powerful incentive to both employers and employees to
substitute nontaxable benefits for wages.
35.  Not  unnaturally, both  state-owned enterprises and  firms in the  newly emerging private  sector
respond to these incentives in the tax system to supply nontaxable benefits to employees. Newly emerging
22  The underlying  principle  is that of horizontal  equity,  meaning  that likes  should  be treated  alike.
23  The significant  costs of such anti-avoidance  activity  are illustrated  by the estimate that as much as one-half  of the US Tax
Code before 1986 (the year of substantial  tax reform)  was devoted  to limiting the extent to which taxpayers  could take
advantage  of the lower tax rate applied to income in the form of long-term  capital  gains.  See Charles E. McLure,  Jr.,
cited in Economic  Council  Of Canada, The Taxation  of Savings  and Investment,  (Ottawa,  Ont.: Minister of Supply and
Services,  1987),  p.9.
24  Stephen  A. Woodbury  and Daniel  S. Hamermesh  find that ."..wages  and [nontaxable]  benefits  are highly  substitutable  and
that the demand  for  benefits  is price elastic.  Changes  in income  taxes  induce  a change  in the relative price  of benefits  and
wages that in these samples generates substantial substitution  between wages and nonwage compensation."  Their
estimates suggest  that cuts in average  marginal tax rates of 3-6% in the mid-1980's in the US reduced the share of
nontaxable  benefits in total compensation  by one-half percentage  point (from a hypothetical  19% to 18.5%).  "Taxes,
Fringe Benefits  and Faculty,"  The  Review  of Economics  and Statistics,  Vol.  LXXIV,  May 1992,  No.  2, pp. 294-295.
25  The exception  is that grants or loans  to employees  for housing  are only  exempt  up to 10%  of after-tax  profit of enterprises.
26  In June 1996, the minimum monthly  wage was equal to BYR 100,000.  The average salary in March 1996 was BYR
1,066,600.
27  Khankevich,  in "The Taxation  System  in the Republic  of Belarus,"  (p.  18) comments  that "even though  legislation  says  that
income  tax should  be paid on any form of income,  in this case it is possible  to calculate  the tax amount  but not actually
collect  it."10
enterprises also build housing for their employees, for instance. Some of the new private enterprises are
able to exploit possibilities for tax avoidance in non-taxation of certain types of income in ways that may
be difficult for state-owned enterprises to emulate, however. 28
36.  It  has  been  reported  elsewhere  that  workers  in  some  transition  countries  have  opted  for
preservation of these  nonmonetary benefits instead of receiving wage hikes; the bias  in tax  treatment
described above may suffice to explain why. Great care has to be taken in giving tax incentives for some of
these services, however, with housing being a pertinent example. Most citizens of Belarus pay nothing for
rent in the sense of paying for the capital costs of housing, since the latter has been provided by enterprises
or  the state.  The term that  is frequently translated  as rent-in  Russian  oplata  za  zhil'e-is  simply  a
payment for routine operation (including all utility charges) and maintenance. This explains in large part
why families in Belarus spend so little on housing in comparison to families in OECD countries. Rent and
utilities accounted for only 4.4 percent of family expenditures in Belarus in 1995; less, it might be noted,
than the share of family budgets spent on clothing (6.3 percent) or even alcohol and tobacco (4.9 percent). 29
By  way of contrast, the median share of consumer expenditures on housing and utilities in 23  OECD
countries recently surveyed was 19 percent (in Switzerland).30  The virtual exemption of such a large sector
of the economy from the tax base in Belarus requires that tax rates be raised substantially on remaining
activities to obtain given revenue goals and supplies a potent incentive to seek preferential tax treatment for
other "worthy" activities. It might be objected, of course, that owner-occupied housing in many OECD
economies is also known for receiving preferential tax treatment taking such forms as exemption of returns
and the deductibility of debt-finance from income taxation. Recent research challenges the conventional
wisdom that owner equity in housing is a lightly taxed asset in OECD countries, however. 3'
37.  It is of interest that the Russian Government has recently acted to make fringe benefits taxable in
calculation of the  payroll tax  base  for  social  insurance programs.  A  decree  issued  in January  1996
expanded the payroll tax base in Russia to include non-wage worker compensation in the form of fringe
benefits and payments in kind. The Government of Belarus might well consider following the example of
the Russian Government in broadening the base subject to payroll taxation. The incentive to  substitute
nontaxable fringe benefits for money wages is even higher in Belarus than in Russia as a result of payroll
tax burdens to finance social insurance and related programs. Such payroll taxes amount to 46 percent of
wages in Belarus, as opposed to the 39 percent level applying in Russia.
38.  While pressure to provide "tax  expenditures," or favored tax treatment for  particular activities
exists in all economies, there are methods of controlling such pressure. "Base broadening" by elimination of
tax  incentives  permits  revenue  goals to  be  obtained with  lower  overall  tax  rates,  and  has  become
synonymous with "tax reform" in many OECD economies in recent years. We saw above that reduction in
overall tax rates leads to a reduction in demands for nontaxable fringe benefits. More selective incentives
can also be substituted for blanket exemptions. An example might be to eliminate tax deductibility for
enterprise expenditure on kindergartens but allow daycare expenditures to be deductible from personal
income taxes paid by employees. Individuals might also be required to declare an extensive list of fringe
28  Because  interest income is untaxed,  for instance,  it has been common  practice  for banks to pay their employees  in part in
interest income  on deposits  the banks contribute  to accounts  their employees'  hold  with them.
29  Expenditures and Income of the Population in Belarus: 1995, Table  1.  1. Ministry of Statistics and Analysis,  Republic of
Belarus,  Minsk 1996.
30  Charles Yuji Horioka, "Japan's Consumption  and Saving in International  Perspective,"  in Economic  Development  and
Cultural Change, vol. 42, no. 2, Jan.,  1994, Table 4, p.3 04.
31  "...it is striking that, contrary to popular belief, these rates [effective tax rates for house purchase financed by equity] taking
into account all relevant taxes are not generally low compared to other assets, particularly in the case of zero inflation."
OECD, Taxation and Household Saving, (Paris: OECD,  1994), p. 110.I1
benefits as taxable income-Canada,  for instance, goes so far as to declare frequent flyer points as taxable
income for  recipients! Alternatively, enterprises may  not be  permitted to  reduce their  tax  liability  by
providing some fringe benefits. Australia is one country which has recently tightened up on such corporate
tax deductibility for fringe benefits.
39.  We hasten to  add that  none of these policy options is  intended simply to  increase overall tax
revenues. The primary  objective of these base-broadening exercises is to share a given tax burden more
equitably and efficiently over all sources of income.
Priority Problem Areas: Utilities, Housing and Creches/Kindergartens
40.  Governmental attention in Belarus is currently focused on the problems of enterprise divestiture of
utilities, housing and creches/kindergartens.
41.  The  concern  with  utilities  simply reflects an  interest  in  ensuring continuity of  supply  where
enterprises are failing or are  reluctant to  continue supplying community services because of arrears  in
payment. Problems with cost recovery for utilities in Belarus appear to have been disproportionately those
of recovering such costs from households. According to a letter from the former Minister of Industry to the
Council of Ministers in December 1995, arrears  for heat supplied to residential areas  in December 1995
amounted to over 34 billion rubels but were not consequential for enterprises, government departments or
other "budgetary" organizations. 32
42.  As we  saw above,  the final two years of kindergarten in Belarus  are the  beginning years  of
schooling, since primary schooling in the countries comprising the former Soviet Union begins at the age of
7 years. This would argue for financing of at these final years of kindergarten by means similar to those
used for schooling. Further, expenditures on kindergartens in part represent spending on "custodial"  care
such as daycare or creches. Although kindergarten enrollment has fallen with declining birthrates, its use
for custodial purposes has increased as a share of total enrollment. Owing to recent economic difficulties,
more mothers appear to have chosen early return to the labor force after childbirth. 33 Finally, kindergartens
are part and parcel of the problem of enterprise divestiture of housing. When enterprises created housing
estates, kindergartens were included in the yards of the apartment blocks and so were a joint cost  with
housing.
43.  Enterprise divestiture of housing remains clearly the most substantial adjustment to be made in the
system in view of its importance to consumer budgets, and an understanding of the issues involved requires
an understanding of how housing was formerly provided and financed and what  changes have recently
taken place in this respect. We should note that privatization of housing is proceeding in Belarus, but this
does not affect the analysis. Nor are the problems associated with divestiture of housing  restricted to
enterprises.3
44.  We should note  first  that  housing is  a  liability and  not an  asset of  enterprises.  Indeed, it  is
somewhat of a misnomer to speak of enterprises "divesting" themselves of this "asset." Housing never was
an  asset that  was available  for disposition by  the enterprises which  built it.  Once housing  had  been
allocated to all but contract employees, it was at the disposition of the employee. The occupants could not
32  Letter  to the Cabinet  of  Ministers  from  Minister  V.I.  Kurenkov,  December  15,  1995.
33  Minsk  City  officials  informed  us that  of 90,000  children  in 500  kindergartens  they  were  operating,  some  10,000  were  less
than  3 years  old. Such  creches  were  only  introduced  at the beginning  of 1994,  when  the economic  situation  worsened.
Previously,  mothers  stayed  on paid  maternity  leave  until  children  were  three  years  old.
34  Disposition  of employer  constructed  housing  has also been a problem  for government  departments  (other budgetary
organizations,  in the nomenclature  employed  in Belarus).  Much  housing  formerly  owned  by  the Ministry  of Defense,  for
example,  was  turned  over  to local  authorities  in  Minsk  in 1994/1995.12
be evicted by the enterprise because they changed employers and they could hold this housing after they
retired from the enterprise. They could even swap apartments with other families. Contract workers were
the exception, but even they had the same rights to dispose of housing if they lived in it for 10 years.
45.  Whereas  the connection between enterpnrse-provided  housing and employment in an  enterprise
became increasingly  remote with the  passage  of time,  enterprises were  still  left  with  the  burden  of
maintaining the apartments they constructed; a burden they wanted someone else to assume. Interestingly
enough, the  process  of  enterprises ridding themselves  of their  housing  responsibilities started  before
transition: enterprise housing was being transferred to local executive councils in the early 1980's.
46.  The view set out above that enterprise-produced housing is not considered to be an asset of the
enterprise is supported by  Russian practice in privatization. There, enterprises to be privatized  are not
allowed to include housing, utility networks supporting housing located outside enterprise property,  or
maintenance activities for these activities in their charter capital. 35
47.  Housing nevertheless remains critical to efficient allocation of resources and growth. It has been
estimated, for example, that a quarter of all unemployment in 1992 in Poland was due to limitations on
labor mobility caused by lack of housing. 36 Public policy therefore should be concerned with continuity in
the supply of housing in the transition to a market economy.
Future Governmental Responsibility for and Financing of Divested Services
Divested Services:  Whose  Responsibility?
48.  Which level of government should assume responsibility for those social functions being divested
by enterprises that might continue to be supported by the state? The assumption in most of the literature on
enterprise divestiture of "social" assets in the former Soviet Union is that government provision of these
services should be undertaken by local governments. The question as to whether this is the appropriate level
of government  to undertake these functions is seldom if ever raised, and needs to be examined more closely.
It is obviously appropriate for local governments to be responsible for local infrastructure such as roads,
district heating and water and sewer reticulation. Many of the benefits from these functions are  strictly
local in effect.
49.  Responsibilities for  other  social  services appear  to  have  been  assigned to  different  levels of
government in the past on the basis  of complexity of the services involved. Thus local governments have
been responsible for basic education in the primary schools and for local health clinics, while higher and
more specialized levels of education and medical care were responsibilities of the national government. In
view of their previous responsibilities, local govermments  may be the logical level of government in the
transition  economies to  undertake some social  functions being  divested by  enterprises.  For  example,
kindergartens would seem to be a  logical responsibility for local governments, given that they are  now
responsible for primary school education.
50.  While this  is a point of view that is not common, however, there are legitimate questions as to
whether "people" services such as health  or education are  appropriate local responsibilities. It  is  not
apparent, for instance, that externalities in health or education which lead to government intervention in
provision of these services are primarily local in nature.
35  See Mari Kuraishi and Lev Freinkman,  "Russia:  Enterprise  Restructuring  and Social  Asset Divestiture,"  Notes for  World
Bank/lMF/EBRD  Meeting,  May 31, 1995,  p.5; Freinkman and Starodubrovskaya,  "Restructuring  of Enterprise Social
Assets in Russia," p.  9.
36  Fabrizio Coricelli,  Krysztof  Hagemejer  and Krysztof  Rybinski,  "Poland," in Simon Commander  and Fabrizio Coricelli
(eds), Unemployment,  Restructuring,  and the Labor Market in Eastern  Europe and Russia, EDI Development  Studies,
Washington,  DC., The  World  Bank, 1995,  p. 74.13
51.  The  suitability of services for  decentralized provision may  also  differ among CIS  states.  The
amount of decentralization appropriate for Russia with its  11 time zones, numerous ethnic groups  and
population of 150 million, for instance, may not be appropriate for Belarus with its more compact area and
homogeneous ethnic composition, and population of only 10 million. The period of transition may provide
an opportunity for Belarus to reconsider the assignment of responsibilities between levels of govemment.
One smaller CIS state, Armenia, has, in fact, reassigned responsibilities for education to the center.
52.  Whatever level of govemment is assigned responsibility for these social services being divested by
enterprises, the means of financing assigned for the purpose need to be adequate to perform the function. In
this respect,  some observers have viewed the actual process of assigning "divested social functions" to
subnational govemments as a form of buckpassing by central governments, in that the responsibilities have
37 been transferred without assignment of adequate revenue sources.
53.  Another problem with the question of what level of government should be responsible for these
functions  in Belarus  is  that  neither the allocation of  functions between levels of  govermment  nor  the
financing  of  regional  (oblast)  and  district  (rayon)  governments suggests  that  there  really  are  fully
autonomous local govemments in Belarus. Meaningful local govenmment  requires some autonomy in its
functions and financing. Although local and  regional executive council members are  elected in Belarus,
these subnational levels of govemment are, in other respects, simply lower level branch  offices of the
central or republican level of government. They raise little revenue themselves and often appear to function
as mere agents for the delivery of services such as health and education; the parameters of providing such
services are  set by  the central  government. In these  regards, Belarus is typical  of many  countries in
transition.
Responsibility for  vs. Delivery of Divested Services
54.  We should note that it is the responsibility for functions that is in question here, and not their actual
provision. Actual delivery of these functions can be accomplished by a number of altemative organizations,
including private contractors, non-government organizations and even other levels of government under
contract. Citizens of Belarus might be surprised by some of these alternatives; for example, fire services
are provided entirely by voluntary organizations in Chile, and municipal and provincial police services are
often provided by means of contracts with the federal police force in Canada. Nor is enterprise provision of
these services simply a matter of replacing state-owned enterprises with private enterprises; as has been
repeatedly shown, it is the presence of competition and not simplv state ownership that leads to efficient
provision of these services. 38
Local Government Finance: Problems and Possible Solutions
55.  If some of these "social" functions are to be divested by  firms but continue as a governmental
responsibility, it follows that they have to be acceptably financed. Existing sources of financing may not be
satisfactory for this purpose. Alternative sources of finance include increased cost recovery from users.
37  See for instance Jorge Martinez-Vasquez,  "The challenge of expenditure-assignment  reform in Russia," Journal of
Environment  and Planning, 1994, Vol 12, pp. 277-292; Christine  I. Wallich, "Russia's Dilemma,"  in Russia and the
Challenge  of Fiscal  Federalism,  a World  Bank  Regional  and Sectoral  Study,  ed. Christine  I. Wallich, 1994,  pp. 38-43.
38  According  to one examination  specific  to the efficient  supply  of local government  services,  "most  of the efficiency  gains
from contracting  out have resulted  from an increased  scope  for competition  rather than from the fact that the service was
provided  by a private  contractor."  Harry  Kitchen,  Efficient  Delivery  of Local  Government  Services,  Discussion  paper No.
93-15. School  of Policy  Studies,  Queen's  University,  Kingston,  Ont., Canada, 1993,  p. 22.
In the context  of Belarus,  we note that Presidential  Ukase No 351 of 4 September  1995 simply orders the reduction  of
housing  maintenance  expenditures  by 10-20%  by the introduction  of "contracts."  These contracts  do not reduce housing
maintenance  costs by encouraging  competitive  provision  of communal  services.14
Where this is not appropriate, financing could be sought from the local or the central governments. If local
governments are to be used as agents of the central government in delivering services, appropriate means of
transfers  have to  be devised for  this purpose. Partial  or bridge financing by  enterprises might also  be
requested to ease the problems of divestiture.
Sources  of Local  Government  Finance  and  Trends  Over  lime
56.  Table 4 indicates the sources of budget revenues for subnational governments and their changes
over  recent  years.  As  will  be  described  below,  some  subnational  functions  are  also  financed  by
extrabudgetary  funds.  Table  4  reveals  what  appears  to  be  a  striking  increase  in  centralization  of
government in Belarus in recent years: in the period from 1992 to 1996, the share of total budget revenues
allocated to  subnational governments decreased from 70 percent to 48 percent. The primary  sources of
local government revenues are  shown to  be  revenue sharing  with the  central  government and  direct
subsidies from the central government. The share of explicit central government subsidies in local budget
revenues has been growing rapidly in importance, from 1.4 percent in 1992 to 24 percent in 1996.
57.  Table 4 also confirms that there is little independent local government financing in Belarus-as
such financing is known in other countries. As a proportion of local government revenues in Belarus, Table
4 shows that local taxes accounted for the puny share of only 0.6 percent in  1995 and are projected to
account for only 0.4 percent in 1996.
58.  The so-called local taxes that regional and district governments are permitted to levy are for the
most part minor "service" fees such as license fees for dogs or parking charges, although local governments
do have the right to levy "sin" taxes on tobacco and alcohol. With the exception of the sin taxes, these taxes
which have been assigned to local governments are not real revenue raising instruments.
59.  Local governments were originally given wider scope to  impose local taxes:  Khankevich (p.19)
observes that "when the existing taxation system was introduced local authorities were granted the right to
impose within their jurisdictions local taxes, duties and levies without legislative restrictions as to their
number, composition and maximum amount." This experiment led to complaints by enterprises about tax-
grabs by local authorities. As a result, the taxes that local governments could impose on enterprises were
restricted in 1993 and a ceiling was imposed on their total burden. They are not allowed to exceed more
than 5 percent of a firm's disposable profit or 3 percent of its added value.
Table 4:  Sources of Subnational  Government Revenues and Share of Subnational  Government Revenues  in
the Central Government Budget
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
Total subnational  revenues  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
*Nationaltaxesentirelyallocatedto  52.7  43.4  50.5  52.5  31.0
subnational  governments
-National  taxes  shared  with central  45.9  53.9  46.6  24.3  44.4
government
*Central  government  subsidies  1.4  2.7  2.9  22.6  24.2
*Local  taxes  and duties  0.6  0.4
Share  of local revenues  in budget  of the central  70  60  56  55  48
government
Source:  Khankevich, "The Taxation System in the Republic of Belarus," p.4115
60.  The central government acted correctly in restricting the ability of local governments to  impose
some types of taxes. For efficiency reasons, most tax policy specialists support restrictions on the ability of
local governments to impose corporate taxes, for instance, so that local governments cannot "export" the
burden of their actions to non-residents.
Weaknesses of Revenue  Sharing: Rural Local Governments and Stability of Transfers
61.  As Table 4 indicates, revenue sharing is the principal method of financing subnational governments
in  Belarus  by  budgetary  revenues. Table 5  indicates  1996 sharing  arrangements for  each major  tax.
Revenue sharing is intended to  be a  form of untied transfer  payment, in which the central government
shares some of thc taxes it collects with local governments according to the "derivation" principle, or the
area  of  origin  (or  collection)  of  central  government taxes.  In  revenue  sharing  arrangements,  local
governments have no control over the base and rate structure of the tax and are not responsible to taxpayers
for  funds obtained. A serious problem with revenue sharing based on the derivation principle is that it
yields more resources to the wealthier regions and makes interregional income imbalances worse.  This
reflects pattems of production and the fact that most taxation in Belarus is based on the source or location
of production, rather than the residence of the taxpayer or the destination of goods taxed. 39 Revenue sharing
arrangements accordingly reflect these concentrations in the location of output in Belarus.
62.  We can illustrate this generic defect of revenue sharing by examining the case of agriculture and by
extension agricultural districts in Belarus. Because it regards agriculture as a particularly troubled sector,
the Government of Belarus has made significant efforts to lower this sector's tax burden. As a result, while
the share of GDP arising from agriculture was 11 percent in 1995, the sector accounted for only 5 percent
of total tax and extrabudgetary fund revenues.  40 Ironically, such favorable tax treatment for agricultural
producers  penalizes  subnational governments in agricultural  areas,  because  75  percent of  subnational
government  revenues are  derived  from  revenue  sharing  on  the  basis  of  taxes  collected  within  the
subnational jurisdictions.
63.  Revenue sharing  in Belarus  has  another  shortcoming. The  distribution  of  revenue sharing  is
decided annually in  Belarus by  means of the  State  Budget  Law. It  would obviously be  desirable  for
subnational  governments to  have  more  stability  in  their  revenues for  planning  purposes.  Transfer
arrangements for  longer periods  of time exist  in market  economies. In  Canada,  for  instance, federal-
provincial transfer arrangements are renewed by federal legislation every 5 years, and changes within the
period require notification and in some instances compensation.
39  Personal  incomc  taxes, as well as wage taxes  to finance  social insurance  programs,  are deducted  by the employer  at source
in Belarus,  whereas the personal  income  tax is often  based on rules applying  where people live (rather than where they
work)  in OECD countries. Profit  taxes  are similarly  collected  on the basis of where  corporate  headquarters  are located  in
Belarus, and property  taxes are naturally  origin-based  taxes. Under GATT  rules, the destination  principle is normally
applied in taxation  of goods  traded intemationally,  so that tax rates are detemnined  by the jurisdiction  in which the goods
are purchased.  In the case of Belarus,  the VATr  is based on the source  of production  although  there is a lack of cohcrcnce
in the principles  applied to taxing intemational  trade.  As a result, most Belarus  taxation is source or origin based, as
opposed to residence or destination based, and  tax-sharing arrangements  reflect concentration in  the  location of
production  by region  and hence produce  disparities  in regional  revenues.
40  See Khankevich,  "The Taxation  System  in the Republic  of Belarus,"  p. 16. By  way  of contrast,  industry  accounted  for 26%
of GDP  and 47% of tax and extrabudgetary  fund revenues.16
Extrabudgetary  Funds  Table 5:  1996 Revenue Sharing in Belarus
64.  We noted above that subnational  Share of National  Taxes  Allocated to Central and Subnational
governments  have  received  a  rapidly  Budgets
decreasing  share  over  time  of  budget  Central  Local
revenues  in  Belarus.  Belarus  has,  Tax  Government  Budget  (°/)
however,  made  increasing  use  of  the  Budget  (°/)
device  of  "earmarked"  or  VAT  50  50
"extrabudgetary"  funds  to  finance  Profit  tax  60  40
critical  governmental needs.  While  all
taxes and contributions were equal to 50  Excise  70  30
percent of GDP in 1995, extrabudgetary  Personal  Income  Tax  100
funds amounted to  19 percent of GDP,  Real Estate  Tax
or  38  percent  of  all  taxes  and  * Central  government  property  100
contributions. Even more extraordinary,  - Subnational  Government  100
such earmarked funds are scheduled to  Proper
increase  to  56  percent  of  government
receipts  in  1996,  so  that  more  Severance  Tax  100
government revenues will  accrue  from  Tax on Potassium and Rock Salt  50  50
off-budget  than  from  on-budget  Extraction
sources  !41  Land  Tax
65.  This  extrabudgetary  financing  * Within  cities  40  60
method  has  been  adopted  to  support  - Outside  cities  25  75
operating  and  maintenance  costs  of  Chernobyl  Tax  100
kindergartens and housing, which as we  State Duty  100
have  seen  are  two  of  the  principal
social  assets"  of enterprises  that  are
increasingly  being  divested  to  local  Fire Team  Maintenance  Duty  100
governments. Two extrabudgetary funds  Duty on  the right to use public  100
were  instituted  in  May  1992  and  roads
December  1993  for  kindergartens  and  Source: Khankevich,  "The Taxation System in the Republic of Belarus," p.
39
housing  respectively.  In  the  case  of
housing, 0.5 percent of enterprise revenues have to be devoted to maintenance of housing. If not spent
directly by the enterprise, payment of an equivalent amount of enterprise revenues has to be made to the
local executive councils for support of housing. The burden of this levy on the turnover of enterprises is
substantial. Further, the required rate of earmarking revenue is arbitrary and has little to do with the costs
of maintaining housing-complaints  about the burden of this earmarked tax  led to its rate being reduced
from 1 percent of enterprise revenues in 1995 to 0.5 percent for 1996.
66.  Funding for the operations and maintenance costs of local kindergartens is also promoted by an
extrabudgetary fund, but one levied on after-tax profits. Local executive councils are permitted to raise this
levy at a rate varying from 1 percent to 5 percent of the after-tax profits of enterprises. (Minsk City levies a
5 percent tax). Again, the tax is only collected if enterprises do not spend the specified amount directly on
their own kindergartens. This source of financing obviously varies with the profitability of firms.
67.  It is widely acknowledged that the use of extrabudgetary funds, or the "earmarking" of revenues
for specified purposes,  should be restricted to those instances where there is a strong benefit connection
41  All data in this paragraph  are taken  from Khankevich,  "The  Taxation  System  in the Republic  of Belarus,"  p.11.17
between the expenditure financed and the revenue raised-that  is, when the latter is basically a user charge
for the former. Conversely, earmarking of funds is inappropriate where there is no such benefit rationale;
where the activities concerned redistribute income, for  example. All other prospective public programs
where there is no benefit rationale should receive general fund financing and should compete on the same
terms for  these limited public funds within a  common budgetary framework.  It  is therefore cause  for
concern that  56 percent of all government receipts in Belarus are currently flowing into extrabudgetary
funds. By these standards, too, housing maintenance and kindergartens are not appropriately financed as
benefit taxes  by the extrabudgetary funds levied on enterprises in Belarus. The financing of these major
fringe benefits is redistributional. In the case of both housing and kindergartens, enterprises are footing the
bill  for  activities  which  benefit  only subsets  of  their  employees and  which  also  benefit many  non-
employees. As we have seen, for instance, those now living in housing built and maintained by enterprises
often have no past or present connection with the enterprise.
Potential Sources of Finance
User Cost Recovery
68.  Appropriate financing for local utilities requires full cost recovery from users. Low levels of cost
recoverv for housing and utilities were a matter of deliberate redistributional policy in the Soviet Union,
and low-priced energy helped to make this policy possible. This policy proved difficult for the authorities in
Belarus to change. As late as 1994, the cost recovery rate for all housing maintenance and utilities was only
about 10 percent and was as low as 4 percent for heating and 2 percent for housing maintenance and water.
The cost recovery rate for electricity was significantly higher than for most utilities, but was still only 25
percent.
69.  These cost recovery rates  were unsustainable once Belarus no  longer had access to low-priced
energy. In 1995, the government  pursued a policy of increasing housing and utility cost recovery ratios with
determination. As  a  result,  household cost  recovery  ratios  were raised  to  50  percent  for  household
maintenance, 65 percent for heating, 54 percent for water and 84 percent for electricity.
70.  An important step towards increasing user cost recovery for household utility services is to meter
individual apartment usage, since this enables the household to control its own usage. In the former Soviet
Union, electricity usage was the only household utility which was individually metered-which  may also
account for the fact that it had the highest cost recovery rate. Belarus has taken an important step towards
increasing user  cost  recovery for  other  utilities  with a  government initiative to  encourage additional
metering for household water supply. 42 Metering of water supply to households has yet to be adopted in
many other member states of the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, it would seem to be impractical to
meter individual household usage of heat in many of Belarus'  Soviet era apartment buildings. Installation
of individual metering for apartments would necessitate complete replacement of the plumbing systems in
these buildings.
71.  It is enigmatic to an outsider that property owners and residents in Belarus actually continue to
receive subsidies for housing maintenance, particularly where housing is being privatized. The principle
that is applied is that if one type of housing occupant gets a subsidy, all housing occupants benefit from the
same  subsidy  regardless  of  whether  the  housing  is  enterprise,  state  or  privately  owned.  Housing
maintenance services are an  obvious case  where user  cost  recovery principles should be  applied-the
42  The program  was launched on 7 June 1994  by a decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, and consists of metering  for both
individual  apartments  and apartment  blocks. Although  apartment  meter  installation  was subsidized  by 75% in 1995  and
by 50% in 1996,  the subsidy  is scheduled  to be reduced  to 25%.18
resident of Grodno should not be expected to pay for maintenance of housing which has been privatized in
Minsk, for instance.
72.  Objections to user cost recovery for housing and utilities often rest on assumptions that users in
transition economics will not be able to afford the price levels entailed, given their current reduced incomes.
Such arguments ignore the fact  that shortfalls  in cost recovery are now being paid  for  somehow-by
taxpayers,  including those who do not use these utilities, or by  "inflation taxes" arising  from printing
money to finance government deficits. Cost recovery from users leads to savings which can be applied to
reduce these taxes or government  deficits.
73.  It is, in fact, counterproductive to subsidize aggregate utility use for distributional reasons-better-
off people benefit more from such subsidies since consumption normally rises with  income. 43 Belarus
appears to be no exception to this rule. The 1995 Household Budget Survey shows that average monthly
spending on rent and utilities rose from 57,000 rubels per  family member in the lowest quintile of the
income distribution  to  67,000  rubels  in the  highest income quintile.44 The Government of  Belarus  is
attempting to deal with income distributional problems arising in payment for housing and utilities in a
more appropriate manner than by subsidizing all users. As described in the World Bank's  recent Poverty
Assessment for Belarus, low-income  households receive housing allowances if payments exceed 15 percent
of household income. 45 This approach targets assistance to families in greater need and would also seem to
be appropriate for dealing with distributional considerations which arise in provision of services other than
housing and utilities, such as daycare.
Property and Real Estate Taxes
74.  Property and real estate taxes are appropriate means for financing municipal services to property,
such as street lighting and road maintenance. Indeed. Appendix B indicates that  property taxes  are the
principal form of autonomous finance of local governments in OECD countries. Keen (p.  4) notes that
property taxes accounted for 5.5 percent of all OECD governmental revenues in 1992 and only 2.7 percent
of total revenues in Belarus in 1995, or less than half of their comparative importance in OECD countries.
Belarus needs a more useful form of property or real estate tax than the present land use tax, however,
which in  1995 cost more to  collect than  it raised in revenue!46  Fortunately, reform of this tax  is being
considered by the Task Forces examining tax reform in Belarus in 1996.
Appropriate Forms of Central Transfers to Local Governments in Belarus
75.  It is clear that local governments will not be able to finance municipal services from their own
revenues until appropriate tax instruments such as a reformed property tax are put in place. Indeed, there
will always be a  case for transfers  to enable poorer local governments to provide critical services in a
maimer  similar  to  that  in  better-off  localities. To  achieve  this  objective, some  systematic  form  of
"equalization" of local revenues is needed in Belarus. (The argument for such transfers is separate from
that for personal transfers such as low-income  supplements or unemployment insurance). While the central
government of Belarus recognizes this need, it deals with it currently in ad hoc ways-by  subsidies which
differ by locality and by changing the local share in revenues assigned to oblasts. For instance, the share of
lower-income oblasts in VAT revenue is higher than that  permitted to the city of Minsk (which has the
43 For  an explanation  and  graphical  illustrations  of this  point,  see  the  World  Development  Report, 1994  (Washington,  DC,  The
World  Bank, 1994),  p 81.
44 Expenditures  and Income of the Population  in Belarus: 1995,  Table  t .2E. Ministry  of Statistics  and Analysis,  Republic  of
Belarus,  Minsk  1996.
45  Paolo  Roberti  et al.. Belarus: An Assessment  of Poverty and Prospects  for  Improved Living Standards. World  Bank
(EC4CI), June 1996.
46  The  conventional  definition  of a "nuisance  tax"  is that  it costs  more  to levy  than  it raises  in  revenue.19
status of an oblast). These local revenue shares have been changed several times in an attempt to benefit
low-income regions.
76.  The most thoughtful approaches to these intergovernmental  transfers involve formula financing for
transfers from central to local governments, where the criteria for the transfer is determined in advance by
legislation. Formula financing of transfers to local government makes possible greater stability, certainty
and  openness in  these  payments.  Because  this  formula  financing is  systematic  and  open,  it  avoids
implications that some kind of political slush fund is involved and reduces the interminable bargaining that
was (and continues to be) a feature of interregional distribution in the former Soviet Union and many of its
successor states.
77.  Equalization  schemes in  many countries  compensate  for  differences  in  local  revenue-raising
capacity, and sometimes also for local cost differences in supplying services. 47 Such equalization payments
are unconditional with respect to uses of the funds.
78.  "Conditional"  grants  are  also  used if  higher levels of  government wish  to  ensure  that  local
governments supply specific services (an example might be to encourage the teaching of the Belarusian
language in schools) or to ensure that specific levels of service are provided (usually minimum levels of
service). Such grants give general guidance to local governments providing the service with respect to the
objectives of the donor government but do not lead to the latter micro-managing  the service. 48
79.  The Government of Belarus should consider adoption of such formula financing. Since officials in
the Ministries of Economy and Finance are interested both in formula approaches to equalization and in
conditional grants from the republican to  subnational governments, the World Bank might well consider
arranging courses for officials in Belarus on such approaches to intergovernmental  financing.
Continued Partial Financing  or Bridge Financing of Services by Enterprises
80.  Some incentives already exist for enterprises to  share the burden in transferring assets  to local
governments.  Thus  local  executive  councils have  the  right  not  to  accept  housing  or  kindergartens
enterprises wish to divest, if the latter are not in "satisfactory" condition. While it is presumed that local
governments would be obliged to accept most of these assets if an enterprise failed, some kindergartens are
known to have been closed by enterprises rather than tumed over to local governments.
81.  Perhaps  more use  might be made of continued enterprise contributions to  aid divestiture.  An
example might be drawn from the case of educational institutions where human capital is being created
which is to some extent specific to the enterprise. One large enterprise interviewed in Minsk, for instance,
had just divested a trade school to the local authorities but will continue to hire many of the graduates. The
local authorities would seem to have a good case for asking for some continued support from the enterprise
for such schooling.
Conclusion
82.  In Belarus  as in  other former command economies, divestiture of "social assets"  is seen as  a
necessary process in the transformation of enterprises so that they can function appropriately in a market
47  Equalization  schemes  based on fiscal capacity usually  calculate the per capita revenue-raising  capacity of all taxes in
different regions and redistribute  revenues  to achieve  some target of relative per capita fiscal capacity in all regions.
Such  programs  may consist  of direct redistribution  between  regions,  as in Germany,  Switzerland  and Denmark  or indirect
redistribution  as in Canada,  where equalization  schemes  for provincial  revenues  are a constitutional  responsibility  of the
federal  government.
48  Conditional  grants have  also been recommended  for use in Russia.  For a more  detailed  description  of this type of transfer,
see Annex  4, "Conditional  Grants: International  Experience"  in World  Bank Country  Study,  Fiscal Management  in the
Russian  Federation,  1996.  pp.  141-145.20
economy. An important public policy problem in transition economies is widely considered to be that  of
maintaining supply of these services after enterprise divestiture.
83.  The present study finds that the terrn "social assets" is a misnomer for just  about all  enterprise
activities described under this heading in Belarus, most of which are simply fringe benefits that are part of
the  wage  bargain  with the  employee. Provision of these  fringe  benefits  was  a  rational  response  by
enterprises to shortages of labor and constraints on wage offers in the old command economy and firms in
market economies have responded similarly to such economic incentives to provide fringe benefits. The
favorable tax treatment of fringe benefits explains much of their continued importance, both in Belarus and
elsewhere.
84.  These fringe benefits were cut by  at least two-thirds as a  proportion of employee remuneration
between 1994  and  1995 in Belarus. The economic downturn in this  period contributed to the  relative
decline in payment of these benefits, particularly those involving capital expenditures such as housing
construction and maintenance. The relative decline in fringe benefit payments may not have been so great
had enterprises not been required to fulfill a number of costly unfunded government mandates, such as that
of maintaining employment at levels estimated by some to amount to overmanning equal to 40 percent of
the labor force. In effect, enterprises may  have cut fringe benefit payments to pay  for  these unfunded
mandates.
85.  Larger enterprises were found to provide more of these fringe benefits than other firms and the
quality of enterprise provision of these services is generally considered to be  superior to  comparable
services provided by government. Research in other CIS countries has found that some enterprise workers
collect substantial rents  in providing these  fringe benefits,  however, thus  inflating costs  compared to
government provision.
86.  It is eminently debatable whether most of these fringe benefits should receive continued public
subsidy or preferential tax treatment. There is a strong case for some government funding of the public
health  and kindergarten services being divested by  enterprises. Enterprise divestiture of  public  utility
services and  housing  is  also  a  cause  for  concern  during transition.  As  much  as  a  quarter  of  total
unemployment  in transition  economies has  been  attributed  to  the  lack  of  labor  mobility  caused  by
unavailability of housing.
87.  Those  services which enterprises are divesting but which  should be  retained as a  government
functions are often assumed to be the appropriate responsibility of local governments. Local infrastructure
is clearly an  appropriate local government responsibility but the reasons for  assigning services such as
education and health to local governments are more debatable.
88.  Financing  arrangements have  not  kept  pace  with  reassignment  of  functions  to  subnational
governments, nor  even  with  performance of  their  existing  functions:  the  subnational  share  of  total
government revenues declined from 70 percent in 1992 to 48 percent in 1996. Special extrabudgetary funds
have  been  created to  finance  local government operation  of  kindergartens and  housing  maintenance,
however.
89.  There  are  other  problems  with  existing  means  of  financing  local  governments.  A  principal
difficulty with revenue sharing, which accounts for 75 percent of subnational government revenues, is that
it yields more resources to wealthier regions and makes interregional imbalances worse.  Tax breaks to
agriculture have also reduced revenue sharing with rural local governments. There is no close link between
beneficiaries and payments which would justify the use of the present extrabudgetary funds for  housing
maintenance and kindergartens. Too much use, in fact, is now made of extrabudgetary funds in Belarus-
their revenues now exceed those on budget so that programs on the budget are not competing on a  level
playing field for more than half of public resources. Finally, true subnational taxes-those  whose base and21
rate structure are determined by subnational governments and for which the latter are responsible to their
own electorates-raise  insignificant amounts of revenue.
90.  The financing of local utility services is most appropriately accomplished by user cost recovery,
with any resulting income distributional problems being addressed by direct income support measures such
as the housing allowance that the Government of Belarus has instituted. Belarus also needs effective real
estate taxes to finance local government services to property: the existing land use tax has been a nuisance
tax, in that it costs more to administer than it raises in revenues. Where transfers to local governments are
required, formula financing is suggested. Such formula financing is appropriate for  both unconditional
grants  to  low-income local governments and conditional grants  to  support  specific objectives such  as
maintaining minimum national standards in services delivered by local governments.22
APPENDIX A
The Relative Burden of Wage Taxes in Belarus, the OECD
and European Union
91.  The argument that wage taxes levied to finance social protection programs such as pensions and
unemployment compensation are of a  size capable of threatening "competitiveness" of enterprises in the
former command economies is frequently encountered. Payroll taxes account for 46 percent of payrolls in
Belarus. The Social Protection Fund is financed by a  35 percent payroll tax,  the Employment Fund  is
financed by a further  1 percent payroll tax and an additional 10 percent tax on payroll is levied to pay for
measures to ameliorate the effects of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Social security levies in many CIS
countries such as Russia account for slightly smaller total shares of payrolls, 49 but even payroll taxes in the
range of 35 percent to 40 percent of payroll in many Eastern European countries arouse concern because of
possible adverse effects on enterprise and national competitiveness.
92.  A good case can be made, however,  that these payroll taxes are not substantially larger than similar
taxes  in many Western industrial countries. Furthermore,  payroll taxes  may  be  a  suitable method of
financing appropriately designed social security programs.
93.  The importance of payroll and social security taxes  as a  source of revenues in Belarus can be
compared with European and OECD practice.  Keen (p.4) reports that  social security and payroll taxes
accounted for 26.3 percent of revenues in Belarus in  1992, 25.9 percent of revenues of OECD member
countries, and 29.3 percent of revenues in European Union  countries.
94.  The greater use made of payroll taxes by European countries is of interest from the point of view
of the competitiveness hypothesis, as is the size of the effective tax  rate on  earnings in many of these
countries. In a  1996 article, Kesselman compares effective tax rates on earnings for OECD countries. He
finds that, "at  earnings of USD 20,000 (noted as being near the average earnings rate  in most OECD
countries considered), the total average effective  payroll tax rate exceeds 35 percent in 8 of the 20 countries
tabulated; it exceeds 45 percent in Belgium, France, Greece and Italy." 50
95.  What might also be taken into account is the finding in the present study that payroll is only part of
worker remuneration in Belarus because the "social benefits" provided by enterprises are not taxed as part
of payroll, or indeed as personal income. We found that such fringe benefits amounted to 35 percent and 12
percent of wages and salaries in 1994 and  1995 in Belarus. Consequently, the "effective" (as opposed to
nominal) wage tax would have amounted to only 30 percent of worker remuneration in 1994 (.46*.65=.30)
and 40 percent of worker remuneration in 1995 (.46*.88=.40). The relevance of this calculation of effective
payroll tax rates is shown by the recent decision of the Government of Russia to expand the payroll tax to
include non-wage worker compensation, as indicated in a decree of January 1996.
96.  It is also relevant to include income taxes in comparisons of tax burdens on wages. The personal
income tax is almost exclusively a tax on wages and salaries in Belarus, is levied on a narrow base because
49  Commander  and Lee with Tolstopiatenko  found  that "payroll  taxes and deductions  comprise  up to 40 percent of the wage
bill" for a large sample of Russian industrial  firms in 1994. See Social  Benefits and the Russian  Industrial Firm, p.3.
Current employer  contribution  tax rates for social insurance in Russia appear to be 38.1% of payroll,  with employees
paying 1% of gross salary to the pension fund (information  from Mark Sundberg,  World Bank, EC3C2, 20 October,
1996). Kesselman reports employer  contribution  rates for Russia which were 1% lower in  1993.  See Jonathan  R.
Kesselman,  "Payroll  Taxes  Around  the World:  Concepts  and Practice,  " Canadian  7ax Journal 1996,  Vol.  44, No 1, p.78.
Ibid, p.78.23
of non-taxation of fringe benefits, and does not assume the importance as a revenue source that it does in
OECD countries. Lumping the personal income tax together with payroll and social security taxes in his
1996 inquiryv Keen (p.6) finds that these three taxes account for  32 percent of tax  revenue in  Belarus
compared to 55 percent of tax revenue in both the European Union and OECD countries. The differences in
relation to GDP are not as marked but are still substantial. Keen finds that the three taxes  account for
about 16 percent of GDP in Belarus and about 21 percent in the European Union and OECD countries.
97.  Finally,  tax  specialists who  have  considered the  question  do  not  view  payroll  taxes  as  an
inappropriate means of financing social security programs. Kesselman concludes for example that,
Payroll taxes in general are a relatively efficient form of taxation in the long run, at least
compared with taxes on income or capital. They can also be simple and low-cost to operate
for both governments and taxpayers. When tied to benefits in a well-designed  program of
social security, payroll taxes offer the additional advantage of posing minimal distortions
to  labor  and  other economic behaviors.  This  potential  is unlike most  other  forms  of
taxation, which have unavoidable efficiency costs
98.  In one respect, Kesselman's conclusion suggests that our inquiry into the effects of wage taxes in
the former command economies has been literally one-sided. A comprehensive assessment of the impact of
wage taxes  in these countries would also need to take into account the benefits obtained from the social
insurance programs financed by these wage taxes.
s'  Jonathan  R. Kesselman, "Payroll  Taxes in the Finance  of Social Security,"  Canadian  Public Policy, vol. 22 (June 1966),
p.  174.24
APPENDIX B
Autonomous Sources of Revenue for OECD Local Governments:  Property vs. Income
Taxes
99.  Where the application of direct user charges are impractical, forms of the property tax have been
the traditional source of much local government finance in many parts  of the world. In terms of OECD
usage, the property tax is the primary (and often the only) local government tax in the Netherlands and the
English-speaking countries-Australia,  Canada, the United States, Ireland, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom. Income taxes are more important as a source of local government revenues in other European
countries and Japan. In his recent survey of OECD practice for the Bank, McMillan notes that out of 24
countries, local governments in 20 countries have property taxes and in 17 have income taxes.
100.  One has to be careful, however, to ensure that local income taxes are not simply revenue sharing
arrangements, where local governments have no control over the base and rate structure of the tax and are
not responsible to taxpayers for funds obtained. As McMillan and Bird and Slack observe, a number of
52 revenue sharing arrangements of this type are recorded in OECD statistics as local income taxes.
101.  Table 6 shows that  if one excludes income taxes identified by  McMillan as revenue sharing (in
Austria, Germany, Norway and Spain), revenues from property taxes exceeded revenues from local income
taxes in the OECD in 1990 by 4.5 percent (USD 283 billion as opposed to USD 271 billion).
52  McMillan  observes  that "where  property  taxes prevail, rates are locally  established. In contrast,  local income tax revenues
are typically  shared revenues  not determined  by local authorities. Denmark  and Sweden  are exceptions  demonstrating
the viability  of true local income  taxes." Melville  L. McMillan,  "A Local  Perspective  on Fiscal Federalism:  Practices,
Experiences  and Lessons from  Developed  Countries,"  PRDPE  (processed)  1994,  (p. S-l).  Bird and Slack observe that
"the property  tax has the clear advantage  from  a political  and accountability  perspective  that it is, as a rule at least, in part
a locally  designed  and locally-implemented  tax...Potentially  more  productive  altemative  "local"  taxes  on income  and sales
in most countries  do not have this advantage  because  not only the design and administration  but even the rates of these
taxes are almost  always  determined  by central, not local, authorities."  Richard  M. Bird and Enid Slack, "Financing  Local
Government  in OECD  Countries:  The Role of Local Taxes and User Charges," in J. Owens and G. Panella eds., Local
Government:  An International  Perspective,  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1991), p. 90.25
Table  6: Comparative  Importance  of Local Income  and Property  Taxes,  Selected OECD  Countries,  1990
Income  Tax  Property  Tax  GDP  Income  Tax  Property  Tax
Country  As Percentage  of GDP  (USD  Million)
Australia  - 1.1  296,300  - 3,259
Austria  [2.0]  0.4  157,380  [3,148]  630
Canada  - 2.8  570,150  - 15,964
Switzerland  4.7  0.7  224,850  10,568  1,574
USA  0.2  2.9  5,392,200  10,784  156,374
Belgium  1.6  - 192,390  3,078
Denmark  14.4  1.1  130,960  18,858  1,441
Finland  10.9  0.1  137,250  14,960  137
France  0.5  1.5  1,190,780  5,954  17,862
Germany  [2.7]  0.6  1,498,210  [40,452]  8,989
Iceland  4.5  1.2
Ireland  - 1.0  42,500  - 425
Italy  0.7  - 1,090,750  7,635
Japan  5.3  1.9  2,942,890  155,973  55,915
Netherlands  - 0.8  279,150  - 2,233
New  Zealand  - 1.9  42,760  - 812
Norway  [9.0]  0.9  105,830  [9,5251  952
Portugal  0.4  0.8  56,820  227  455
Spain  [0.81  2.0  491,240  [3,930]  9,825
Sweden  17.9  - 228,110  40,832
Turkey  1.8  0.1  96,500  1, 737  97
United  Kingdom  - 0.6  975,150  - 5,851
Total  270,607  282,794
Sources:  World  Development  Report,  1992 and McMillan,  Table 5.
NOTE: Income taxes  for countries whose rates  are indicated  in brackets were treated as revenue sharing and not included in the calculations.26
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